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This paper investigates the avenues accessible to U.S. 
policymakers seeking to take advantage of China’s recent economic 
prosperity in their efforts to assist the recovery of the U.S. economy 
from the 2007 Global Economic Crisis. More specifically, this paper 
assesses the present state of U.S.-China trade and investment 
relations, identifying obstacles and possible remedial measures. 
Additionally, this paper looks at the potential for investment-based or 
fee-based immigration policies as a source of economic stimulus for 
the United States. 
A Primer on Trade and Investment 
Trade and investment are two of the most prominent forms of 
financial transactions between parties. Trade is the business of buying 
and selling or bartering of commodities. Investment, on the other 
hand, may be defined much more narrowly. Investment in a financial 
context is defined as putting money into something with the 
expectation of gain within a certain period of time, where there is a 
high degree of security for the investment capital and for a return.1 
Investment is distinguishable from trade most notably in its 
involvement of a temporal element. For example, whereas a single 
trade transaction in its simplest form can be visualized as two parties 
standing face to face, each handing over to the other a package 
containing the goods or commodities agreed upon, a single 
investment transaction cannot be similarly characterized. Given the 
definition of investment, supra, a single investment transaction in its 
simplest form involves two separate performances between the two 
parties. The first performance is the actual “investment” part of an 
investment transaction. It involves an investor providing a certain 
amount of money to finance a project, with the expectation that this 
money (i.e., the investment capital) will provide the investor with 
some financial gain (i.e., the returns) within a certain period of time. 
A period of time, however, is typically required before the investor 
 
1 See generally BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS (1934). 
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can realize his financial gains, during which the project is expected to 
grow and profit. Once this period of time has transpired, the second 
performance involved in an investment transaction can take place. In 
the second performance, the investor liquidates his interests in the 
project, returning to the investor a sum of money equal to the 
investment capital and the returns. This is commonly known as 
divestment. 
In the context of trade and investment between parties belonging to 
different sovereign states, the temporal aspect involved in investment 
provides an added layer of legal complexity. A key aspect of 
investment is that the investor reasonably seeks security for the 
investment capital provided between the time when he finances the 
project with the investment capital and the time when he gets back the 
investment capital plus returns.2 Where the investor and the 
investment project belong to different sovereign states, the investor 
must consider the governing laws of the state in which the investment 
project is located, or more plainly stated, the legal environment to 
which the investment capital will be subject during the ordinary 
course of business. 
For state policymakers, the added complexity involved with 
international investment is a principal reason why policies relating to 
international trade are often considered prior to those relating to 
international investment. Moreover, the trade-related policies and the 
experiences gained during the negotiation of said trade-related 
policies often provide the groundwork upon which subsequent 
investment-related policies build. U.S.-China economic relations 
follow this pattern. 
Modern History of Sino-U.S. Relations 
In understanding the history of economic relations between the 
United States and China, it is valuable first to get an overview of 
twentieth century Sino-U.S. relations and recent Chinese history. The 
present day Chinese government, headed by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), came to power in 1949 after seizing control from the 
then U.S.-backed government led by the Chinese Nationalist Party 
(KMT) in what is known as the Chinese Civil War. For over two 
decades after 1949, the CCP-led Chinese government and the United 
States had no diplomatic relations. This can be attributed to a myriad 
of factors. A few worth mentioning include United States support of 
 
2 Id. 
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the KMT, adversaries to the CCP during the Chinese Civil War, CCP-
led China’s support of North Korea in the Korean War, and CCP-led 
China’s support of the North Vietnamese Army during the Vietnam 
War. Then, in the early 1970s, then President Richard Nixon made a 
visit to China. He was among the first Americans to visit China after 
the establishment of the CCP-led government in 1949. Several years 
of informal Sino-U.S. diplomacy followed, finally resulting in the 
establishment of formal diplomatic and trade relations between 
Communist China and the United States near the end of the 1970s. 
I 
TRADE 
China’s early domestic economic policies designed to encourage 
foreign trade provided the building blocks that eventually permitted 
China to become the United States’ second largest trading partner. 
Trade between the United States and China in 2011 totaled over $500 
billion.3 Notably, nearly eighty percent of that total trade value is 
attributable to exports from China to the United States. 
While the historical significance of trade-related policies cannot be 
denied, the present-day economic impact of trade policies is 
substantially diminished in comparison; instead, investment-related 
policies are taking center stage. This is in accordance with the 
globalizing investment trend and the reduced impact of geographic 
boundaries.4 Nonetheless, it is imperative to gain an understanding of 
how U.S.-China economic policies, initially motivated by a mutual 
desire to improve trade relations, laid both the legal groundwork, and 
no less significantly, the international relations groundwork, for their 
progressively deepening bilateral economic relationship. 
A. The Mao Era (1949–1976) 
The undeniably protectionist and economically isolationist policies 
advanced by CCP China’s then supreme leader Mao Zedong 
dominated China’s economic policy between modern China’s 
founding in 1949 and Mao’s death in 1976. The CCP’s emergence as 
the victor of the Chinese Civil War over the U.S.-backed KMT left 
China in the hands of a government with a distrust of the United 
 
3 Top Trading Partners—December 2011, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1112yr.html (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2014). 
4 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 9 (2008). 
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States and of the West in general. Moreover, Mao’s vision of Chinese 
prosperity was undoubtedly shaped by his own life experience, which 
saw much of China under de facto colonialism rule since the Opium 
Wars of the mid-nineteenth century. For example, for much of the 
early half of the twentieth century, China’s preeminent port city of 
Shanghai was carved up into numerous (predominantly European) 
foreign concessions, each of which was administered and governed by 
a foreign power. Similarly, in the wake of the fall of the Qing dynasty 
in early twentieth century, Japan took control of China’s Northeast, 
occupying a territory the Japanese formed into a puppet state called 
Manchukuo. The Chinese Civil War and the Sino-Japanese War left 
Chinese domestic industry in shambles. As such, it was Mao’s 
position that China under CCP governance could not afford to permit 
any subsequent foreign physical or economic incursion. 
Consequently, for the substantial majority of China’s governance 
under Mao, China’s foreign economic policy was with few 
exceptions, dominated by strict isolationism. 
B. China’s Road to WTO Accession (1976–2001) 
During the twenty-five years following Mao’s death in 1976, 
China’s domestic economic policies underwent a period of significant 
liberalization. An about-face from Mao era isolationism took place 
almost overnight, as progressive CCP member Deng Xiaoping fought 
off significant political adversaries to become China’s new de facto 
supreme leader. China, under Deng’s leadership, adopted a new 
position on foreign economic relations, wherein it opened its doors to 
the West. This new policy, however, was not without its share of 
challenges. China’s former leader Mao Zedong was not completely 
unwarranted in his belief that China’s fledgling domestic industries 
could not withstand the vigor of international trade. China, as it stood 
subsequent to the Chinese Civil War, had little bargaining power with 
respect to any prospective trade partners. To be a viable trade partner, 
one must have something that another party wants. Pure barter aside, 
this assertion means that a viable trade partner must have goods that 
someone else is willing to pay money for, or alternatively, money to 
purchase someone else’s goods. China, however, possessed neither of 
these in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Having operated for over two 
decades as a closed-off, state-run economy with no meaningful use 
for currency, Chinese citizens had no money with which to purchase 
foreign goods. Additionally, China’s state-run industries had little 
technology or practical expertise and produced goods that were 
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frequently undesirable, or were of inferior quality compared to 
alternatives that potential trade partners could obtain overseas. 
Over the next twenty-five years, Chinese policymakers steadily and 
incrementally improved China’s appeal as a trade partner. Starting 
with little more than a blank slate, policymakers determined that 
China first needed to produce goods desirable to the export market to 
generate profits for Chinese businesses and the Chinese government. 
1. China’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and the Influx of Trade-
Related Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) designated by the Chinese 
government attracted the attention of many foreign multinational 
companies, and headlined China’s approach to increasing the role it 
played in international trade. For most foreign companies considering 
business with China in the 1970s, the overwhelming desire was to 
access China’s cheap labor force for the specific purposes of mass 
production. In return, China would benefit from the foreign capital, 
technology, and practical expertise provided by the foreign investors 
incident to their establishment of manufacturing operations in China. 
The SEZs consisted of a series of cities (or in the case of Hainan, 
an entire province) designated by the Chinese government where 
foreign investors would enjoy special preferential treatment.5 Two 
key benefits that encouraged foreign investment in China’s SEZs 
were the preferential tax treatment associated with SEZ businesses 
and reduced interference by China’s central government.6 Most early 
foreign investments in SEZs were related to export-oriented projects, 
as the government sought to generate an influx of currency for foreign 
exchange.7 
Foreign investments in SEZs were also significant in that they were 
among the first times private property interests were recognized in 
China under CCP governance. More specifically, the Chinese 
government recognized investment by foreign corporations as direct 
investment rather than portfolio investment. Direct investment 
involves the purchase or acquisition of interest in a business that 
permits active control of the company.8 By contrast, portfolio 
 
5 Jian Zhou, National Treatment in Foreign Investment Law: A Comparative Study from 
a Chinese Perspective, 10 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 39, 52 (2000). 
6 Id. at 54. 
7 Id. at 52. 
8 Direct Investment, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/direct           
-investment.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2014). 
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investment is generally limited to passive investment in securities, 
which does not involve active management or control of a company.9 
The primary avenue for foreign ownership of business interests in 
China through foreign direct investment (FDI) was through the 
formation of a joint venture (JV) with a Chinese company. Given the 
near absolute absence of privately owned property interests in CCP-
led China in the late 1970s, it should be no surprise that early FDI 
into China was used to form JVs with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
owned and operated by the Chinese government. 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the relative success of the initial 
FDI-funded, export-producing JVs, many of which were located in 
China’s SEZs, affirmed a central tenet in the Chinese central 
government’s economic plan. To a limited extent, the Chinese 
government had succeeded in using FDI to finance the Chinese 
manufacture of exportable goods, the overseas sale of which provided 
China with an injection of foreign exchange.10 This manufacturing-
centric, trade export-oriented, foreign-exchange-generating strategy 
would dominate Chinese foreign economic policy for much of the 
next two decades. 
2. Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Accession 
The central role played by FDI in China’s industrial transformation 
and consequent role as a global trade juggernaut provides a fitting 
backdrop for a discussion about the significant role played by China’s 
foreign investment-related policy changes in securing China’s 
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Joining the 
WTO was key for economically export-dependent China. Among the 
many consequences, China’s membership in the WTO would mean 
that many “Made in China” goods would be charged lower tariffs by 
other WTO member trade partners, as well as be protected from 
nontariff barriers such as quotas otherwise applied to Chinese goods 
by many WTO member trade partners.11 
The United States, on its own behalf and de facto on behalf of the 
WTO, negotiated with China through much of the 1990s, ultimately 
 
9 Portfolio, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/portfolio.asp (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2014). 
10 See Zhou, supra note 5, at 52. 
11 See Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China’s WTO Accession Saga, 15 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1469, 1479 (2000). 
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playing a pivotal role in China’s eventual 2001 WTO accession.12 In 
1992, the United States and China signed a bilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding, wherein the United States agreed among other things, 
to support China’s goal of becoming a WTO member in return for 
China’s phasing out of certain trade-related barriers hindering U.S. 
access to the China market.13 Despite valiant early efforts, however, 
China was unable to secure a seat as a founding WTO member in 
1995.14 Rather, the United States continued working with China 
throughout the remainder of the 1990s, further paving the path to 
China’s eventual 2001 WTO accession with the signing of the U.S.–
China Bilateral WTO Agreement signed November 15, 1999.15 
The 1999 U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement was aptly named 
because it included a substantial number of key obligations China was 
required to accept in order to secure its 2001 WTO accession.16 To 
avail itself to WTO membership privileges, China was required to 
fulfill a series of reciprocal trade and trade-related investment policy 
obligations.17 WTO membership demanded that China reduce or 
completely phase out various protectionist policies with respect to the 
penetration of foreign goods in the Chinese market.18 These included 
tariffs, quotas, subsidies to domestic industries, state-fixed pricing on 
goods, and preferential regulatory treatment of domestically produced 
goods. 
At least equally significant, however, was the WTO’s requirement 
that China comply with a number of investment-related obligations 
relating to the operation of foreign-invested businesses in China. A 
first set of obligations comprised general improvements to the 
Chinese legal system, including increased legal rights, legal 
transparency, and legal uniformity.19 A second set of obligations in 
the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) may 
be characterized as a progressive effort towards a national treatment 
policy with respect to foreign-owned business interests (i.e., afford to 
foreign-owned business interests treatment no less favorable than that 
afforded to Chinese-owned business interests).20 Among others, 
 
12 Id. at 1487. 
13 Id. at 1485. 
14 Id. at 1490. 
15 Id. at 1511–12. 
16 Id. at 1511–19. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 1511–19. 
20 Id. 
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obligations included increasing the foreign-owned stake permitted in 
Chinese-Foreign JVs and granting to foreign investors access to 
industries formerly limited exclusively to domestic investment.21 Also 
included were a series of highly specific measures concerning trade-
related investment, prohibiting any requirement that a foreign 
enterprise use or purchase domestic products, quotas on an 
enterprise’s use or purchase of imported products based on the 
volume or value of the enterprise’s export trade balancing 
requirements, restriction of an enterprise’s ability to import by 
limiting its access to foreign exchange, and restriction of an 
enterprise’s exports relative to the amount of goods it produces for the 
Chinese domestic market.22 
The TRIMs obligations that China was required to accept prior to 
admission to the WTO is consistent with the ever-increasing impact 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) on global trade transactions. In the 
China context, the United States and western European nations sought 
to use FDI to establish export producing manufacturing facilities in 
China, a nation with low labor costs.23 This trend perhaps also 
reinforces the global push towards an increase in the financial volume 




This paper was motivated by a desire to investigate the avenues 
accessible to United States policymakers seeking to take advantage of 
China’s recent economic prosperity in their efforts to assist the 
recovery of the United States economy from the 2007 Global 
Economic Crisis. A combination of the comparatively advanced 
developmental state of U.S.-China trade policies and the significantly 
greater financial volume of foreign investment in comparison to 
foreign trade25 suggest that inquiry ought to be made with respect to 




22 Trade-Related Investment Measures, JAPANESE MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE 
AND INDUSTRY (2012), http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/gCT9908e.html (last 
visited Nov., 2014). 
23 Bhala, supra note 11, at 1507. 
24 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 4, at 2. 
25 Id. 
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Investment treaties are perhaps the most important tool 
policymakers use to either to pave the path toward or stimulate 
international investment. No analogous multilateral investment 
organization to the WTO presently exists. One key reason for the 
absence of a multilateral investment analog to the WTO is the 
strategic nature of investment itself. As discussed earlier, trade can be 
simply visualized as a concurrent exchange of commodities between 
two parties, whereas the typically longer duration involved in 
investment presents additional complexities.26 These complexities are 
exacerbated when the investment transaction being considered 
involves a project located in a foreign sovereign state. For at least the 
reasons stemming from these fact-specific and situation-specific 
complexities, bilateral investment treaties between two specific 
parties seeking to develop or advance an investment relationship, 
rather than a single, overarching, multilateral WTO-type agreement, 
constitute the principal legal document defining the rights and 
obligations concerning international investments. 
A. Negotiating a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) to Promote FDI 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) provide the treaty parties with a 
better opportunity to tailor an agreement to their respective national 
interests.27 The principal purpose of the BIT is little different than that 
of any other economically motivated agreement. The parties seek an 
agreement that will yield both nations some economic benefit. History 
has shown, however, that the terms in many (if not most) BITs tend to 
favor the more the developed, economically dominant nation, who 
uses its greater bargaining power to secure said favorable terms.28 
A key objective shared by almost all BITs is to protect the interests 
of an investor where the investor belongs to one treaty party and he 
seeks to invest in an enterprise located within the territory of the other 
party to the treaty.29 While the specific provisions and the precise 
degrees of protection differ with each BIT, typical BITs include 
provisions addressing the document’s scope of applicability, equal or 
fair treatment of the foreign investment, protection against 
 
26 Id. at 3–4. 
27 Id. at 4. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
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expropriation, and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms through 
international arbitration.30 
No BIT currently exists between the United States and China. 
Scholars and commentators have suggested that a BIT would have a 
significant, positive economic impact on the respective economies of 
the United States and China.31 To that end, however, it is this author’s 
opinion that significant economic impact would be indirect rather 
than direct, and perhaps more attenuated than expected. One reason 
for this conclusion is that China and the United States do not fit the 
traditional BIT mold. Historically, BITs frequently involved one more 
developed “investor” party and one less developed “investee” party, 
wherein the terms of the BIT generally contemplate single direction 
capital flow.32 The investor party, who seeks strong protection for its 
investments in the investee party, typically drafts such BITs 
predominantly.33 Generally, the investee party is willing to accept 
terms favoring the investor party because the investee’s primary 
objectives during negotiations are to establish a BIT to encourage 
inbound investment capital and to acquire the technology and 
business expertise incident to foreign investment projects.34 As a 
consequence of the strong investment protection for investor party 
assets conceded to by the investee party, such a BIT justifiably results 
in strong investor confidence, which in turn tends to produce 
significant increases in the volume of investor party investments in 
the investee party.35 
The type of BIT described above that contains terms offering 
strong protection of foreign investment, however, is significantly less 
likely to be agreed upon when the parties involved are not a 
traditional capital-exporting investor party and a capital-importing 
investee party. In cases where only single-direction capital flow is 
anticipated, strong protection for investment is highly favored by the 
capital-exporting investor, and generally acceded to by the capital-
 
30 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www 
.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2014) [hereinafter 
U.S. Model BIT]. 
31 Daniel Michaeli, Let’s Negotiate an Investment Treaty with China, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/china/lets-negotiate-investment    
-treaty-china/p24630. 
32 See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 5, at 18–19. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 22–23. 
35 Id. 
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importing investee who needs the money.36 BITs, however, are 
generally drafted to provide reciprocity and investments from either 
party are governed by the same terms and subject to the same 
protections.37 Where neither nation is exclusively capital exporting or 
capital importing, the protection offered to Party A’s investment in a 
venture located in Party B’s country is similarly afforded to Party B’s 
investment in a venture located in Party A’s country. In such a case of 
dual-direction capital flow, parties may be less likely to bargain for 
such strong terms because while such terms offer protection for 
outbound investments, the terms obligate the party to afford the same 
protection to inbound investments originating from the other treaty 
party. For this reason, where parties contemplating a BIT contemplate 
dual direction capital flow, the degree of investment protection 
offered by the BIT ultimately agreed upon by both parties is likely to 
be reduced. Coincidentally, due to the reduced investment protection 
offered by the terms of the BIT, the resulting impact on investment 
volumes is likely to be diminished. 
The U.S.-China case at the present time may arguably be 
characterized as such a situation where dual direction capital flow is 
contemplated. Historically, as described above in the context of trade-
related investments, the United States clearly played the role of the 
capital exporting investor nation, and China that of the capital 
importing investee nation. Coincidentally, the traditional concern was 
the protection of United States investments in China.38 But there 
exists at least a modicum of evidence to suggest that what perhaps 
was the most relevant economic dynamic between the United States 
and China in the late twentieth century is gradually changing. With 
respect to the potential U.S.-China BIT, commentators are beginning 
to consider the potential BIT implications of issues arising from 
Chinese investment interests in the United States.39 
B. The Appeal of Inbound Chinese Foreign Direct Investment 
Economic relations between the United States and China have 
changed drastically in the past several decades. Following the 
unprecedented and predominantly export-driven economic growth 
 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 22. 
38 See Zhou, supra note 5, at 49. 
39 Duncan Hollis, What will a U.S.-China BIT do to Investor-State Arbitrations?, 
OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 22, 2010, 9:06 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/03/22/what-will-a-us   
-china-bit-do-to-investor-state-arbitrations/. 
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China experienced between 1980 and the early 2000s, China currently 
is no longer in desperate need of FDI. A significant amount of export-
related foreign exchange is presently available in China, largely as a 
result of prodigious exports by China’s state-owned and privately 
owned enterprises.40 China is currently the largest capital surplus 
economy in the world, with foreign exchange reserves last tallied at 
well over three trillion U.S. dollars.41 Coincidentally, it perhaps 
should not be surprising that Chinese are questioning whether 
additional inbound FDI is necessary, or for that matter, desirable.42 
China’s newfound wealth notwithstanding, however, what has not 
changed is that China is still seeking out technology and expertise,43 
much as it was when, under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, it opened its 
doors to foreign investment over three decades ago. 
In contrast to China’s capital surplus and arguably excess FDI, 
inbound FDI is likely to be beneficial to the United States. In contrast 
to China’s three trillion dollar capital surplus, as of 2012 the United 
States has an existing public debt of over sixteen trillion U.S. 
dollars.44 This is despite the recent financial success of U.S. 
companies such as Apple, Google, ExxonMobil, Chevron, and Wal-
Mart, all of whose stocks charted near all-time highs as recently as 
2012. This seeming contradiction makes slightly more sense upon 
recognizing that the principal means for the United States to generate 
governmental revenue is through tax dollars,45 or more specifically, 
from income tax.46 Following the 2007 global economic crisis, the 
 
40 Instant view: China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves Hit $3.2 Trillion, REUTERS (Oct. 
14, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/14/us-china-economy-inflation-iv-id 
USTRE79D18E20111014. 
41 Id. 
42 Kevin Davies, Inward FDI in China and its Policy Context, VALE COLUMBIA 
CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 5 (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www 
.vcc.columbia.edu/files/vale/documents/China_IFDI_final_18_Oct_0.pdf. 
43 Nargiza Salidjanova, Going Out: An Overview of China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment, U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, GOING OUT 19, http://origin 
.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/GoingOut.pdf. 
44 Galen Moore, U.S. National Debt Surpasses $16 Trillion, BOSTON BUS. J. (Sept. 5, 
2012, 6:16 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/mass_roundup/2012/09/us         
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45 Roberton Williams, The Numbers: What are the Federal Government’s Sources of 
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46 JOHN A. MILLER & JEFFREY MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL TAXATION 4 
(2d ed. 2010). 
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United States experienced record levels of unemployment.47 It is not 
unreasonable to infer that the elevated levels of unemployment in the 
United States contributed to a reduced volume of income taxable by 
the federal government. This suggests at a very high level the finances 
of the U.S. government would benefit from a reduction in 
unemployment in the United States. 
Reducing the unemployment rate has a direct effect on those who 
regain jobs and salaries. The significance for the U.S. government, of 
course, is not limited to tax revenues derived from ability to tax that 
income. Job creation will result in equally significant intangible 
consequences, namely the indirect confidence in the domestic 
economy gained by the rest of the population and the consequent 
consumers’ desire to spend. This stimulation of capital flow has 
significant tax consequences at each successive financial transaction. 
For example, consider a scenario where Raw Material Corporation 
sells raw material to Component Corporation to manufacture a 
component using said raw material. Component Corporation sells its 
components to End Product Corporation, who assembles said 
components into an end product that is sold to consumers. Assuming 
that all parties are located in the United States, the business profits of 
each corporation are subject to federal taxation. Consequently, the 
more money each corporation makes, the greater the tax revenues. 
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to suggest that one of many parallel 
avenues that may help reduce the U.S. public debt and improve the 
U.S. economy may be effected through the creation of jobs, which in 
addition to directly providing tax revenues, is also likely to elevate 
consumer confidence and result in elevated and taxable corporate 
profits. 
C. National Security as an Obstacle to Inbound Chinese FDI 
Given the combination of China’s seemingly bottomless foreign 
reserves, China’s continued desire to procure technology and 
expertise, and the potential job-creating benefit of inbound FDI to the 
United States, it is not unreasonable to contemplate permitting or 
even encouraging the sale of U.S. enterprises possessing such 
technology and expertise sought by China, to Chinese businesses and 
investors, as a means of stimulating the current U.S. economy. The 
involvement of the Chinese government in a vast number of the more 
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significant Chinese-outbound FDI projects, however, has seemingly 
proven to be an unfortunate deterrent to such sales. A number of 
individuals in the United States are concerned that Chinese FDI will 
have adverse effects on U.S. national security.48 It appears that these 
concerns are only exacerbated by the Chinese government’s 
encouragement of Chinese-outbound FDI through mergers and 
acquisitions for the strategic purposes of acquiring natural resources 
and high technology.49 
In recent history, there have been several notable investment 
attempts by Chinese-controlled entities that were foiled by the U.S. 
government’s Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS) on the basis of national security concerns. 
1. Background Information: The Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States 
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS) is a committee of the executive branch formed pursuant to 
President Gerald Ford’s Executive Order 11858 in 1975.50 From the 
start, one of CFIUS’ principal functions was to review pending 
foreign investments in the United States that may have implications 
for U.S. national interests.51 In contrast to Caius’s humble origins as 
one of many executive committees whose primary responsibilities 
consisted mainly of “monitoring,” “coordinating,” “analy[zing],” and 
“guid[ing]” the U.S. President,52 subsequent statutory amendments 
have steadily increased Caius’s role with respect to U.S. foreign 
economic policy. Notably, the Exon-Florio Amendment enacted by 
Congress in 1988 granted to CFIUS the power to review all foreign 
investments that may affect national security.53 The President now has 
the power to unilaterally block any investment CFIUS deems to pose 
a security threat to the United States.54 In 1992, the Byrd Amendment 
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further required CFIUS to investigate all proposed foreign 
investments where the investor is acting on behalf of a foreign 
government.55 By 2007, Caius’s increasing role in U.S. economic 
relations was deemed important enough to warrant the Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA), which 
provides, among other things, that CFIUS activities thereafter be 
subject to broader Congressional oversight.56 
2. CFIUS Effects on China FDI Attempts 
In recent years, CFIUS has arguably scrutinized investments of 
Chinese origin more so than investments originating from anywhere 
else. This is attributable at least in part to the publicity generated by 
China’s unparalleled economic growth over the past several decades, 
the pervasive and frequently murky involvement of the Chinese 
government in purportedly private industries, and the Chinese 
government’s encouragement of outbound FDI for strategic purposes 
through mergers and acquisitions. Since the Exon-Florio Agreement 
granted the President the power to block foreign investment pursuant 
to CFIUS national security concerns in 1988, only two foreign 
investment attempts have been explicitly blocked by the President of 
the United States.57 Both of those investment attempts involved 
investment capital originating from China.58 Other investment 
attempts by Chinese investors were voluntarily terminated by the 
investing parties upon facing CFIUS opposition and, at times, 
political pressure from Congress.59 We look at a few of the more 
prominent of these cases in turn. 
In 1990, President George H.W. Bush was the first U.S. president 
to exercise his CFIUS/Exon-Florio power to block foreign investment 
on the basis of national security considerations.60 The thwarted deal 
involved China National Aero-Technology Import & Export 
Corporation’s (CATIC) attempt to acquire Seattle-based MAMCO 
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Manufacturing.61 CATIC was (and is) a Chinese state-owned 
enterprise whose principal business is the manufacture of military 
aircraft intended for use by the Chinese government. MAMCO, the 
target of the acquisition, was a small, U.S.-based aircraft component 
manufacturer that supplied components to U.S. military aircraft 
manufacturers Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. 
In 2012, President Barack Obama was the second U.S. president to 
exercise his CFIUS/Exon-Florio power to block foreign investment.62 
President Obama ordered Ralls Corporation to divest its holdings in 
several wind farm projects located in Oregon, citing the wind farm 
projects’ proximity to a U.S. Naval Weapons Training Facility as 
posing a national security threat.63 The Ralls Corporation is a U.S. 
company incorporated in the state of Delaware.64 Ralls is privately 
owned by two executives of Sany Heavy Industry Co., Ltd. (“Sany” 
hereinafter), a Chinese company that is one of the world’s largest 
heavy equipment manufacturers.65 Sany’s primary business involves 
the manufacture of machinery related to concrete, coal mining, pile 
driving, road construction, wind power, port operations, and other 
assorted hoisting machinery.66 Ralls’ intention was to install Sany-
manufactured wind turbines at the Oregon wind farm sites.67 
In addition to the two investment attempts that were expressly 
blocked by the President of the United States describe above, several 
other investment proposals involving investment capital of Chinese 
origin were withdrawn by their respective Chinese investors 
subsequent to less direct U.S. opposition. In 2005, China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) attempted acquisition of 
American oil company Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) 
for $18.5 billion was foiled by CFIUS-related national security 
concerns.68 CNOOC is a Chinese state-owned oil company. CNOOC 
withdrew its bid after significant political tension in Congress relating 
to a general concern with the Chinese acquisition of such a significant 
volume of oil assets.69 
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In 2008, renowned U.S. private equity company Bain Capital, in 
conjunction with China’s Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.’s (“Huawei” 
hereinafter), attempted to acquire U.S. technology company 3Com for 
$2.2 billion.70 Huawei is a privately owned company whose business 
is the design and manufacture of telecommunications and networking 
equipment. Its products also include multimedia technology, 
smartphones, and tablet computers. 3Com is a (now defunct) U.S. 
company whose business was the design and manufacture of 
networking equipment. Bain Capital and Huawei ultimately withdrew 
their bid subsequent to significant CFIUS opposition. Huawei’s status 
as a private (i.e., not state-owned) company notwithstanding, CFIUS 
was concerned about Huawei’s relationship with Chinese military and 
intelligence agencies.71 CFIUS cites as its basis for this concern that 
Huawei’s founder was an officer in China’s People’s Liberation 
Army twenty-some years ago prior to his founding Huawei.72 
Each of the four failed investment attempts involving China FDI 
discussed above (i.e., CITIC’s attempted acquisition of MAMCO, 
Ralls wind farms projects in Oregon, CNOOC’s attempted acquisition 
of Unocal, and Bain/Huawei’s attempted acquisition of 3Com) were 
foiled, at least in part, on the basis of CFIUS opposition citing 
somewhat amorphously defined “national security concerns.”  From 
these cases, a few general trends can be drawn. First, with respect to 
the admission of investment, Chinese investors are not treated the 
same as U.S. domestic investors when it comes to the defense 
industry. Second, a scenario generally arousing U.S. concern is an 
investment attempt by China state-owned enterprises (SOEs); some 
people fear that the principal purpose of the investment is to advance 
China’s global political interests as opposed to the SOE’s economic 
interest. 
As discussed previously, CFIUS opposition to all four investment 
attempts involving China FDI was purportedly on the basis of U.S. 
“national security concerns.” Of the four cases, President George 
H.W. Bush’s block of the CATIC’s attempted acquisition of 
MAMCO Manufacturing is probably the most justifiable on national 
security grounds. MAMCO was an aerospace component 
manufacturer supplying components for companies engaged in the 
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production military aircraft for the U.S. military (e.g., Boeing, 
McDonnell Douglas).73 CATIC, the Chinese state-owned company 
who sought to acquire MAMCO, was, and still is, engaged in the 
business of manufacturing military aircraft for the Chinese military.74 
A Chinese state-owned company’s most senior executives are 
typically appointed by the government. At least circa 1990, it is not 
unreasonable to infer that CATIC’s corporate goals were closely tied 
to those of the Chinese government. The acquisition of a U.S. defense 
industry manufacturer by a foreign state-owned company is precisely 
the type of FDI attempt that CFIUS was established to flag. 
We next look at CNOOC’s attempted acquisition of Unocal in 
2005 and Huawei and Bain Capital’s attempted acquisition of 3Com 
in 2008. CNOOC is a Chinese state-owned oil business that sought in 
2005 to acquire assets relating to oil exploration. Huawei is a 
privately owned Chinese enterprise that sought to acquire significant 
assets relating to computer networking in 2008. Congressional delays 
and calls for extensive inquiries with the investing parties 
significantly impeded the progress of both deals. With respect to the 
CNOOC deal, there is little evidence that CNOOC’s acquisition of 
Unocal’s U.S. and foreign oil interests would pose any significant 
national security threat. CNOOC is indeed a Chinese state-owned 
company, and is thus inevitably tied to the Chinese government in at 
least that respect. There is ample evidence in this case, however, that 
CNOOC’s desire to acquire Unocal was motivated primarily by a 
desire to acquire sufficient oil assets to provide for, and profit from, 
China’s increasing domestic demand for petroleum products, 75 and 
not by a strategic, governmental interest of the Chinese central 
government adverse to U.S. security interests.76 
With respect to the 2008 attempt to acquire 3Com, Huawei is not a 
Chinese state-owned company. CFIUS cites as basis for its “national 
security concern” only that the founder of Huawei was a member of 
the People’s Liberation Army prior to founding Huawei twenty-plus 
years ago.77 At the time of this writing, there is little evidence in the 
public record suggesting that 3Com was in possession of any 
technologies or business contracts essential to U.S. national security. 
Given that many Chinese citizens other than Huawei’s founder served 
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in the Chinese military at some point in their life prior to transitioning 
to civilian life, this association alone absent other evidence is at best 
weak support for the contention that Huawei’s desire to acquire 3Com 
was motivated by Chinese governmental strategic interests. 
Finally, we turn to President Obama’s 2012 CFIUS-backed 
divestment order directed at Ralls Corporation. Ralls is a privately 
owned corporation registered and incorporated in the United States. 
The owners of Ralls are Chinese executives of a heavy industry 
manufacturer who sought to develop wind farms in Oregon using 
Chinese-manufactured wind turbines; they have no affiliation with the 
Chinese government. President Obama’s CFIUS order mandating that 
Ralls completely divest its interests in the wind farm projects 
reportedly could cause Ralls to incur up to $20 million in losses.78 
The divestment order cites as basis for its “national security concern” 
the wind farm’s proximity to a nearby U.S. Naval Weapons Training 
Facility.79 This assertion is intriguing because prior to Ralls’ 
involvement, the proposed wind farm sites were not subject to any 
special treatment. The land was held by Terna Energy USA Holding 
Corporation, a subsidiary of a Greece-based consortium,80 who then 
sold its interests to Ralls. President Obama’s divestment order 
nullified the aforementioned transaction, returning possession to 
Terna. In regards to the fairness of President Obama’s rejection of 
Ralls’ ownership of wind farm interests in favor of Terna’s 
ownership, we do not comment. As evidenced by the failed CNOOC 
deal in 2005 and the failed Huawei deal in 2008, however, CFIUS 
rulings are rarely referred to the president before being resolved some 
other way.81 Thus, President Barack Obama’s decision to invoke his 
CFIUS powers to order divestment of Chinese interests in the Ralls 
wind farm project at the height of his 2012 Presidential Campaign, 
suggests at the very least that CFIUS “national security concerns” are 
not completely removed from the demands of domestic U.S. politics. 
The above critique, of course, is offered subject to a significant 
caveat. Namely, the analysis is offered from the perspective of a 
layperson without access to critical, possibly classified information 
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available only to policymakers in the U.S. Federal Government. 
Securing the national security of the United States is undoubtedly one 
of the few unquestioned responsibilities of the U.S. government. The 
government, however, should be ever wary of the use of national 
security as an umbrella term to justify policies motivated principally 
by other considerations, and perhaps only collaterally, if at all, by 
national security. 
D. The Impact of a U.S.-China BIT on Inbound China FDI 
President Barack Obama’s arguably shaky “national security” 
foundation pursuant to which he ordered divestment by Ralls of its 
Oregon wind farm interests illustrates the purpose that a U.S.-China 
BIT could serve. While it is highly unlikely that any U.S.-China BIT 
could completely remove all obstacles to inbound Chinese FDI, 
political or otherwise, even a slightly incremental improvement in 
investor confidence is likely to result in multibillion dollar capital 
injections into the United States. In view of China’s $1.6 trillion 
cumulative investment in U.S. securities,82 the relatively paltry sub-
ten billion83 value of cumulative inbound Chinese FDI (from 2005 to 
2011) is not due to a shortage of available investment capital. Nor is 
it, in view of the failed FDI attempts described previously, 
attributable to a lack of investor interest. Rather, China-adverse 
political attention frequently forces potential Chinese investors to 
voluntarily withdraw or at least significantly reduce investment 
amount.84 This position is bolstered at least by one commentator’s 
observation that China’s sovereign wealth fund and other investment 
entities have attempted to avoid political controversy in the United 
States by limiting its investment, such that its consequent ownership 
shares amount to less than ten percent.85 
There are certain cases, such as those closely related to national 
security, where controversy and heightened attention on behalf of the 
United States government is unavoidable, and perhaps even at times 
warranted, in view of the U.S. government’s responsibility to its 
citizenry. Arguably, President George H.W. Bush preventing CITIC 
(a Chinese state-owned manufacturer of military aircraft for the 
Chinese military) from acquiring MAMCO Manufacturing (a 
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component supplier to manufacturers of military aircraft for the U.S. 
military) presents one such case. There are arguably other cases, 
however, where “national security concerns” have served as little 
more than mere rhetoric purposed to stir up political animosity and 
effect thinly-veiled discrimination. It is this latter behavior that a 
U.S.-China BIT, partly through the treaty’s literal language and partly 
through the symbolic “stamp of approval” effect, has the potential to 
preempt. A stable developmental business relationship between the 
United States and China has the potential for significant consequential 
impact on the global economy, and is arguably too important to be 
left fully exposed to the demands of U.S. politics. To that end, the 
United States and China have been hard at work on refining the terms 
of a U.S.-China BIT.86 
1. Admission of Investment 
A U.S.-China BIT may have significant effects on the admission of 
Chinese investment into the United States. As discussed above, 
admission of Chinese investments has in recent decades been subject 
to close scrutiny on the basis of national security. Pursuant to the 
Byrd Amendment of 1992, CFIUS is to afford exacting scrutiny to 
state-affiliated investments.87 A U.S.-China BIT containing the 
National Treatment and Most-Favored Nation (MFN) Treatment 
clauses such as those found in Articles 3 and 4 of the U.S. Model 
BIT,88 respectively, however, may compromise said national security 
protection efforts unless appropriate legal accommodations are made. 
Most nations reserve certain industries in which ownership and 
control is required to be domestic. Defense-related industries, for 
example, are commonly off-limits to foreign investors. For this 
reason, a BIT containing a general National Treatment clause, stating 
to the effect that foreign investment interests will be treated no less 
favorably than a domestic interest, will likely be accompanied by a 
carve-out provision excluding certain industries from foreign 
investment on the basis of national security. The MFN Treatment 
clause of the U.S. Model BIT is another area of interest. A U.S.-China 
BIT containing a MFN Treatment clause such as that provided in the 
U.S. Model BIT would compel the United States to extend to Chinese 
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investments the same degree of latitude that it does with longtime 
U.S. allies, such as United Kingdom. Such an obligation seems at 
odds with the seemingly heightened scrutiny of investments 
originating from China historically advocated by some guardians of 
U.S. national security interests. Given China’s status as a government 
master-planned economy and the fact that a substantial portion of 
China’s outbound FDI is provided by Chinese SOEs,89 national 
security concerns with regard to Chinese investment are not 
completely unwarranted. For at least this reason, any U.S.-China BIT 
including a MFN Treatment clause is likely also to contain a national 
security “escape hatch” clause of some sort, expressly permitting the 
United States to block Chinese investments on the basis of national 
security concerns without breaching its treaty obligations. 
Another aspect of BITs is the issue of standing. When the 
government of one party to a BIT (i.e., a sovereign state) acts in a 
manner inconsistent with its National Treatment or MFN Treatment 
obligations, an injured individual belonging to the other party to the 
BIT, whether a real person or a corporate entity, will typically have 
standing to file for arbitration under the dispute resolution provisions 
of the BIT.90 In contrast, in the absence of such BIT providing for 
dispute resolution proceedings accessible to the injured party, the 
aforementioned forum would not be available. Historically, under 
multilateral treaties such as the WTO, the standing to bring a claim is 
available only to the treaty parties (i.e., the sovereign states). With a 
U.S.-China BIT in place, investors (e.g., CNOOC, Huawei, Ralls) 
subjected to U.S. Government treatment that is inconsistent with the 
U.S.’s National Treatment or MFN Treatment obligations under the 
BIT would likely have an opportunity to challenge the legality of their 
treatment via arbitration before a neutral, third-party tribunal. In the 
absence of the BIT, the injured investor may, for example, be 
relegated to withdrawing its investment following the first sign of 
U.S. political or media opposition. 
Potential legal consequences stemming from a U.S.-China BIT 
aside, it is incontrovertible that it is economically prudent for the U.S. 
government to exercise discretion in use of its CFIUS powers. 
China’s outbound FDI has gone to very limited areas including tax 
havens and acquiring technology, natural resources, and recognized 
brand names.91 While the FDI being deposited in tax havens may 
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have numerous motivations and justifications, the FDI being invested 
for acquisition of technology, natural resources, and recognized brand 
names has a definite strategic component. The challenge is discerning 
whether (1) the FDI attempt is predominantly motivated by business 
strategy (arguably not invoking CFIUS oversight), or (2) the FDI 
attempt is predominantly motivated by military strategy or will 
significantly undermine U.S. military effectiveness (e.g., where 
CFIUS supervision is necessary). Critics of Chinese FDI in the United 
States frequently try to find some tie between the Chinese investor 
and the Chinese government to make the argument that whatever U.S. 
interests the investor is seeking to acquire has some strategic value to 
the Chinese government.92 Additionally, adverse media attention 
frequently accompanies any sizable investment by China’s SOEs 
(e.g., CNOOC).93 Recent challenges faced by Chinese FDI attempts, 
such as the occurrences described earlier, suggest that any significant 
interests acquired through the use of investment capital of Chinese 
origin causes anxiety in the United States that the increase in global 
interests under the direct or indirect purview of the Chinese 
government somehow undermines the global influence and power of 
the U.S. government. 
The other side of the argument is that the increasingly mutualistic 
relationship between the United States and China suggests that it is in 
the United States’ best interest to carefully weigh the costs and 
benefits associated with invoking CFIUS powers to block Chinese 
FDI. While a large portion of the China outbound FDI is provided by 
China SOEs, there also exists a substantial and ever-increasing 
amount of Chinese-sourced FDI provided by successful, private (i.e., 
non-SOE) Chinese companies (e.g., Huawei, Sany, etc.). To the 
extent that the admission of China inbound FDI that is closely 
connected to the Chinese government sometimes warrants heightened 
scrutiny, and in limited circumstances, even governmental 
intervention, over-application of this general rule inevitably hinders 
the United States from benefitting from large scale, business-driven 
Chinese investments in the U.S. economy. 
In view of the above, it is this author’s opinion that a definition of 
“national security” that is in line with the term’s narrower, militaristic 
roots must be adopted. Consistent with such a definition, a proper 
determination of whether CFIUS should intervene in a business 
transaction involving FDI should hinge on the outcome of a case-
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specific and fact-dependent balancing of the likelihood that FDI result 
in physical harm to the United States or significantly undermine the 
U.S. military’s effectiveness in an armed conflict against the 
likelihood that the FDI will benefit the U.S. economy and the 
magnitude of such economic benefit. More specifically, as discussed 
earlier, the United States may benefit from an injection of foreign 
capital that has the potential to create and maintain jobs, bolster U.S. 
domestic consumer confidence, and increase U.S. government tax 
revenues. 
In review of the four failed FDI attempts involving investment 
capital of Chinese origin discussed earlier, applying said balancing 
test, albeit with only the facts accessible to the general public, yields 
some interesting conclusions. Of the four deals, arguably only 
Chinese state-owned CITIC’s 1990 attempted acquisition of 
MAMCO, the U.S. military aircraft component manufacturer, can be 
reasonably claimed to involve a sufficiently high degree of likelihood 
of adverse impact to the United States military to outweigh the 
economic benefits of the FDI. 
With respect to the FDI attempts involving CNOOC, Huawei, and 
Ralls, however, the facts available to the general public do not paint 
scenarios wherein the likelihood of physical harm to the United States 
is of sufficiently high degree to outweigh the economic benefits of the 
FDI. CNOOC and Huawei involved multibillion dollar acquisition 
attempts of oil assets and non-state-of-the-art networking technology, 
respectively.94 In neither case did the facts made available to the 
general public establish sufficient nexus between the acquisitions and 
actual, non-speculative harm to the United States. 
The Ralls deal involved Caius’s objection to the acquisition of land 
and subsequent construction of wind farms on said land using 
investment capital of Chinese origin.95 CFIUS cited the land’s 
proximity to a U.S. Naval Weapons Training Facility as the reason for 
issuing the divestment order.96 The irony, however, is that Ralls’ 
predecessor in interest in the land was in fact the subsidiary of a 
foreign company, who also intended to use the land to build a wind 
farm, but CFIUS never paid them any attention.97 Given the absence 
of significant connection between Ralls and the Chinese government, 
the mere involvement of investment capital of Chinese origin is 
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arguably insufficient to establish sufficient nexus between the FDI 
and a tangible harm to U.S. security interests. 
2. Fair Treatment and Protection Against Expropriation 
A U.S.-China BIT would likely also contain provisions governing 
the treatment of foreign investments post-admission. A BIT drafted 
pursuant to the U.S. Model BIT will typically include terms 
addressing fair treatment of the foreign investment once admitted, 
including protection against expropriation and specific dispute 
resolution mechanisms through international arbitration.98  As applied 
to a discussion on inbound Chinese investment, these fair treatment 
provisions of a potential U.S.-China BIT are interesting in that they 
could potentially be invoked against the U.S. 
Given the longtime U.S. adherence to the rule of law and the 
United States’ comparatively mature judicial system relative to the 
rest of the world, one might conclude that a fair treatment treaty 
provision is superfluous. The facts of O’Keefe v. Loewen, however, 
suggest that the potential unfair treatment of foreign businesses and 
investors should not be completely ruled out.99 Loewen involved a 
simple breach of contract suit between an American plaintiff and a 
Canadian corporate defendant tried in Mississippi trial court.100 The 
proceeding involved countless inflammatory, anti-foreign statements 
by the American plaintiff as well as a prevalence of erroneous jury 
instructions by the judge.101 The net value of damages at issue in the 
purported contract breach was $2.5 million.102 When the dust settled, 
the Mississippi jury returned a verdict for the American plaintiff in 
the amount of $500 million.103 Mississippi law, which required the 
Canadian defendant to pay $200 million within seven days to stay 
collection of the $500 million jury verdict, served for the Canadian 
defendant as a de facto bar to appealing the decision.104 
The Canadian defendant in O’Keefe v. Loewen subsequently 
initiated an arbitration action against the United States pursuant to 
Article 1116 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
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alleging that the United States breached its obligation under NAFTA 
to secure a minimum standard of treatment to investors from other 
NAFTA treaty parties, here Canada.105 Specifically, Loewen, the 
Canadian defendant, claimed that its treatment by the Mississippi trial 
court was a failure by the United States to comply with its NAFTA 
Article 1105 treaty obligation to provide “fair and equitable 
treatment” to investors from other NAFTA treaty parties.106 The 
NAFTA arbitration tribunal ultimately dismissed Loewen’s case on 
jurisdictional grounds, but the tribunal nevertheless acknowledged 
Loewen’s unfair treatment, admitting candidly that “the [Mississippi] 
trial . . . was a disgrace . . . the tactics of [the American plaintiff] . . . 
impermissible.”107 “[T]he whole trial and its resultant verdict were 
clearly improper and discreditable and cannot be squared with 
minimum standards of international law and fair and equitable 
treatment [as required by NAFTA Article 1105.]”108 
A U.S.-China BIT is likely to contain some variation of the 
NAFTA “fair and equitable treatment” clause discussed in the 
Loewen arbitration, such as that provided by Article 5 of the 2012 
U.S. Model BIT.109 In the context of Chinese FDI, fair treatment 
provisions in a U.S.-China BIT would provide Chinese investors with 
additional protections beyond the U.S. justice system for their 
investments in the United States, as well as financial compensation if 
the United States violates its BIT obligations. These protections 
offered by a potential U.S.-China BIT seem particularly applicable in 
view of the Ralls wind farm project where President Obama invoked 
his CFIUS powers and ordered the wind farm project’s Chinese 
interest holders to completely divest their interests, causing the 
Chinese to incur losses purportedly in excess of twenty million. In 
some ways, this ordered divestment might be construed as indirect 
expropriation of foreign owned investment interests. The Chinese 
stakeholders have chosen to pursue legal action in U.S. courts,110 an 
avenue that may be of limited success given the classified nature of 
facts underlying CFIUS decisions. Were a U.S.-China BIT containing 
fair treatment and expropriation provisions in place, however, the 
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Chinese interest holders in Ralls would at least have at their disposal 
an alternate forum (arbitration) and an alternate legal basis (U.S. 
treaty obligations) for their case. 
III 
IMMIGRATION 
The encouragement of U.S. immigration for the newly wealthy 
Chinese provides yet another possible avenue available to U.S. 
policymakers who seek to take advantage of China’s recent economic 
prosperity to assist the recovery of the U.S. economy from the 2007 
Global Economic Crisis. The Ralls Corporation divestment order 
provides a fitting segue into this discussion. Besides providing a 
backdrop for our discussion of the potential effects of a U.S.-China 
BIT, the reaction by Ralls’ Chinese interest holders amidst the CFIUS 
intervention serves as a reminder that in certain respects, the 
perception of the United States as a desirable place to live and raise a 
family is largely untarnished, its appeal undiminished. One of the 
Chinese executives who was ordered to divest his interests in the 
Ralls wind farm projects pursuant to U.S. national security concerns 
is quoted as saying, “[r]egardless [of the ordered divestment of my 
interests in Ralls], I personally feel that the U.S. is a great nation.”111 
Additionally, he stated that he still hopes to send his son to study in 
the United States someday.112 
China always looked to the United States, perhaps more so than 
any other Western nation, as its developmental role model. To 
illustrate this point, consider the issue of education. In the 1980s, the 
Chinese government sponsored thousands of Chinese to travel to the 
United States (and to a lesser extent, Japan and western European 
nations) to pursue graduate education in science and engineering.113 
While some of these scholars returned to China immediately 
following their education, many chose to put down roots and start 
families abroad.114 As China’s development accelerated in the 1990s, 
China began to look more and more appealing to these overseas 
scholars now accustomed to Western standards of living. In the late 
1990s and early 2000s, many returned to China, often with their 
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families and children.115 These frequently highly educated scholars 
that the Chinese call hai gui are in high demand by China’s domestic 
employers.116 
The return of China’s state-sponsored education recipients during 
China’s development boom did not signify to the Chinese populace 
that the United States was somehow no longer worthy of its role 
model status. Rather, the return of hai gui to China and their rapid rise 
to prominence in Chinese industry removed any remaining inkling of 
skepticism towards the value of an innovation-promoting and leader-
producing U.S. education. Millions of Chinese, particularly those 
inhabiting the “first tier” cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, 
intend to send their children to pursue secondary and post-secondary 
education overseas. Of China’s over one million millionaires, over 
85% plan to send their children overseas for education.117 The United 
States is frequently among these millionaires’ top choices.118 
From the perspective of U.S. policymakers, the favorable Chinese 
predisposition toward the U.S. education system can be used to 
produce tangible economic benefits for the U.S. government both 
indirectly and directly. Pursuant to the U.S. government’s reliance on 
tax revenues, an influx of wealthy Chinese immigrants is inevitably 
accompanied by an injection into the U.S. economy of Chinese-origin 
capital to support the maintenance of the luxurious lifestyle to which 
these wealthy immigrants are accustomed. Another not insignificant, 
albeit more attenuated, indirect benefit is the general fostering of 
relations between the United States and China through this sharing of 
cultures, and the subsequent economic fruits of future collaborative 
efforts between parties from both countries. The less attenuated and 
more direct revenue generating pathways, however, are likely to be 
what is on the minds of U.S. policymakers and hence is what we 
focus on here. 
The principal obstacle for Chinese seeking to procure overseas 
education opportunities for their children is the difficulty of U.S. 
immigration. While student visas are granted liberally to the foreign 
scholars themselves, younger students and students who seek post-
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challenges. With respect to the former, while U.S. boarding schools 
are a viable option, the child-centric Chinese family culture 
attributable in part to China’s one child policy undoubtedly makes 
shipping off a preteen to a foreign country somewhat unappealing. As 
the age of the children sent to study overseas get progressively 
younger and younger, wealthier parents frequently prefer to purchase 
secondary homes in close proximity to where their child is 
studying.119 Frequently, it is desirable for the mother or grandparents 
to be relocated to look after the young child. Thus, notwithstanding 
the liberal granting of student visas to a child student, immigration of 
the child’s caretakers presents its own challenge. Additionally, there 
is an increasing emphasis by potential employers on the relevant 
employment experiences of newly graduated candidates. The U.S. 
student visa system generally bars the visa recipient from attaining 
most forms of legal employment,120 limiting the value of a U.S. 
diploma in securing post-graduate employment for students who 
relied on the student visa for U.S. immigration. 
A. EB-5 Investment Immigration 
EB-5 Investment Immigration provides an existing avenue for 
foreign families seeking to secure U.S. immigration.121 EB-5 is a 
policy instituted in the early 1990s to create jobs and help the U.S. 
economy recover from the then-existing recession.122 Nearly twenty 
years later, China’s newly rich are utilizing the EB-5 Investment 
Immigration program to secure immigration to the United States for 
their children and their families.123 The EB-5 program grants 
foreigners permanent residency in the United States provided that 
they invest in the United States a certain amount of money and a meet 
a series of other investment conditions.124 The first requirement is 
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satisfied if the foreign investor invests in the United States a 
minimum investment of either $500,000 or $1,000,000, depending on 
the geographic location of the recipient of the investment.125 The 
required amount of investment is dictated by the unemployment level 
of the investment location.126 Places with higher unemployment levels 
require the smaller of the two investment amounts, while places with 
lower unemployment and presumably better economies require the 
larger of the two amounts. With respect to the second EB-5 
requirement regarding investment conditions, the principal investment 
condition is that the foreign investment creates or maintains at least 
ten full-time jobs.127 
The principal shortcoming of the EB-5 immigration program is the 
difficulty of satisfying the job-creation requirement. By requiring that 
the investment finance the start or maintenance of a business in the 
United States, EB-5 implicitly requires that the investor or his 
partners possess a certain degree of expertise and experience with 
respect to conducting business in the United States. This is a difficult 
obstacle to surmount, as many potential investor immigrants do not 
possess these qualifications. Taking on one or more U.S.-based 
business partners may provide a viable solution, but some may be 
fearful of being swindled by a business partner located half a world 
away. For at least these reasons, EB-5 investors may be relegated, for 
example, to setting up small businesses such as a restaurant, café, or 
the like, to be managed by one or more family members who relocate 
to the United States for the purpose of accompanying a minor child. 
Given the questionable success rates of U.S. small businesses in 
recent years, however, the proposition of operating a business in a 
foreign country is undoubtedly a daunting one for an individual just 
off the plane from China. Irrespective of a Chinese investor’s 
moneymaking success in China and elsewhere, there is little 
guarantee that this success translates into an ability to successfully 
operate a business in the United States. 
B. Alternative Immigration Policies for High Net Worth Individuals 
While the EB-5 objective of creating U.S. jobs to stimulate the 
U.S. economy from the bottom up through the use of foreign 
investment capital undoubtedly deserves applause, the daunting task 
of operating a U.S. business is likely to undermine the program’s 
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appeal to potential Chinese investors, and in turn diminish the 
intended stimulus effects on the U.S. economy. EB-5 sought to 
provide a direct link between the grant of U.S. immigration and the 
creation of U.S. jobs. For the U.S. government, salaries paid for using 
foreign investment capital means U.S. tax revenues at least in the 
form of federal income tax derivable from said foreign investment 
capital, as well as other taxable transactions. This scenario is 
undoubtedly ideal for the U.S. government. Unfortunately, for at least 
the reasons described above, its feasibility is limited. 
There do exist, however, less direct, immigration-oriented policies 
that the U.S. government could potentially enact to derive economic 
benefit from wealthy individuals seeking immigration to the United 
States. For avenues in which the principal economic objective of job 
creation is more attenuated, a lesser standard of immigration such as a 
long-term visa with no employment restrictions may be more 
appropriate (in contrast to the permanent residency provided by the 
EB-5 program). One option would be to condition immigration on the 
purchase and holding of a certain value of U.S. bonds. Another option 
would be conditioning immigration on the purchase and holding of 
real property of a certain value. Yet another option would simply be 
to charge a high application fee for the long-term visa with no 
employment restrictions. 
The shared premise behind these alternative immigration policies is 
that they are self-selecting for high net worth immigrants and their 
families. The spending of high net worth immigrants necessary to 
sustain the luxurious lifestyle to which they are accustomed injects 
foreign capital directly into local U.S. economies. Chinese 
immigrants are from a background where automobiles, jewelry, high 
fashion, and other forms of conspicuous consumption are still subject 
to high tariffs and middleman markups. A weekend walk through any 
outlet mall in any major city in the United States will reveal the 
hordes of Chinese tourists descending from tour busses ready to spend 
like there is no tomorrow. This spending can have nothing other than 
a positive effect on the U.S. economy. Thus, while jobs are not 
directly created pursuant to the immigration of a wealthy investor, 
jobs and substantial tax revenues will be indirectly generated as a 
consequence of the exorbitant spending in the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, it is unlikely that China’s near future economic plans 
will veer from the historical government-shaped master development 
plan. While some in the United States are concerned with China’s 
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rapid rise and perhaps eventual overtaking of the United States as a 
global superpower, joint efforts by progressive members of both 
China and U.S. governments continue to advance mutual trust in the 
relationship that has taken over thirty years to build. Perhaps some 
more years, however, are required before the U.S. population as a 
whole is comfortable with strategic acquisitions by Chinese 
multinational companies in the United States. The U.S.-China BIT 
that is currently under negotiation will hopefully have favorable 
effects in furthering the economic relationship between the two 
nations, and allow for further mutual prosperity. In the short term, the 
United States should seriously consider policies to take advantage of 
the existing U.S.-favoring personal dispositions of China’s 
Generation X. Policies that condition a grant of U.S. immigration 
upon a sizable injection of foreign capital into the United States 
would ensure an influx of wealthy Chinese immigrants eager to spend 
their hard-earned foreign cash in the United States. 
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